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Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 35, Heritage Imports
("Heritage"), respectfully requests that this Court reconsider
its Memorandum Decision dated March 11, 1999.

Heritage

certifies this request is made in good faith and not for delay.
INTRODUCTION
William Anthony Kraatz ("Kraatz") presented extrinsic
evidence on numerous occasions to the trial court in aid of his
interpretations of the parties 1 Employment Agreement
("Agreement").

He repeatedly failed to object to similar

evidence introduced at trial by Heritage.

Kraatz never claimed

at trial the Agreement was unambiguous, and even admitted on
appeal it was ambiguous.
The case law is clear.

In order to preserve this

issue for appeal, Kraatz must have refrained from introducing
extrinsic evidence and must have preserved the record by
objecting to its introduction by Heritage.

Having failed to do

so, he cannot argue for the first time on appeal extrinsic
evidence was improper.
The first time this issue was raised was at oral
argument when Judge Bench asked counsel for Heritage where the
Agreement was ambiguous.

(Recording of oral argument.)

This

Court then issued its Memorandum Decision ("Decision"), ruling
on page 2 "the trial court did not need to hear extrinsic
evidence."
and sua

In so doing, this Court for the first time on appeal

sponte,

decided as outcome determinative an issue never

1

raised by either party, ever presented to the trial court, and
never briefed or fully argued on appeal.
Case law provides such issues should not be raised by
an appellate court sua

sponte.

Alleged errors must be raised at

trial to allow correction during the course of proceedings.
Otherwise, judicial resources are wasted.
Further, due to the complexities of this case, it is
submitted further consideration should be given to Heritage's
claim the Agreement is ambiguous, especially as to the duties
and responsibilities of the General Manager.

Finally, assuming

arguendo, parol evidence may be challenged for the first time on
appeal and assuming the Agreement is then determined
unambiguous, Kraatz breached it by refusing "to devote his full
and exclusive time to perform" his services and by not
fulfilling his "responsibility to provide management training."
STATEMENT OF PACTS
This Court found error "in considering extrinsic
evidence because the language of the contract is unambiguous."
(Decision, p.2.)

However, when the issues were framed for

trial, there was no claim in the Joint Pretrial Order that the

What wasn't asked was "how" or "why" the lower court made its
determination of ambiguity. The answer is ambiguity was never
doubted. Both parties tried the case on that basis. For this
reason, counsel for Heritage failed to get the "drift" of this
Court's questioning and apologizes for not explaining the
procedural history at oral argument.
2

In the proceedings below, there were 27 depositions, hundreds
of exhibits, and four days of trial, for which Kraatz' counsel
asserted pretrial attorney fees exceeding $200,000. (Joint
Pretrial Order, p. 3.) Much of the time and resources expended
were due to Kraatz' pursuit of parol evidence.

2

Agreement was unambiguous. (See Joint Pretrial Order.)

Kraatz

later admitted to this Court in his reply brief there is
ambiguity.3

More importantly, not only did Kraatz fail to

object to the introduction and consideration of extrinsic
evidence, he introduced much of the extrinsic evidence himself.^
The following are examples of relevant extrinsic
evidence introduced by Kraatz or by Heritage without his
objection.
While Kraatz tries to distance himself from any
responsibility or accountability for the profitability of the
dealership, it is clear that, as found by Judge Frederick, the
"thrust of the negotiations was that the dealership must return
to profitability".

(R. 2467.)

This door was opened by Kraatz 1

counsel.
Q: [by Mr. Zundel] Okay. What did Bry tell
you about his dealership?
A: [by Mr. Kraatz] That it was not doing as
well as he had wanted it to, that Denny
Boyle, who had been with Bry for a number of
years, had left him, I believe, a year

"While the Agreement might be ambiguous about the scope of
Kraatz' specific duties, it is unambiguous that Kraatz promised
to contribute only his 'best professional skill' in performing
them, he did not guarantee success." Kraatz 1 Reply Brief p. 4.)
There are also numerous other examples of extrinsic evidence
relating to the duties of the General Manager set forth in the
trial court's Findings of Fact ("FF") and Conclusions of Law
("CL"). See, e.g., during contract negotiations, Kraatz was
allowed access to all financial records (FF B.4.; R. 2015);
Kraatz' expert admitted the Honda dealership was a "license to
steal," (FF. B.8.; R. 2339); Larry H. Miller testified that one
of a general manager's responsibilities is to manage cash
flow,(FF D.5.) and that the dealership was not undercapitalized
and should have made a profit,(FF E.2-4 & 22; R. 2078, 2081);
and B. Wilkinson told one of his bankers "He had given [Kraatz]
complete control and responsibility for running the dealership."
(FF D.8; R. 2059.)

3

before, that Helen Green had been the
general manager more recently, and that he
didn't like the direction it was going. (Tr.
1751.)
Without objection, Kraatz testified about further
meetings he had with Bry Wilkinson before signing the Agreement.
Kraatz represented, inter alia, the dealership "should be making
a million dollars a year." (Tr. 1851-52.)
Extrinsic evidence came from Kraatz when he testified
about his qualifications, management experience and skills, and
association with other dealers and trade groups. (R. 1748-49.)
When Judge Frederick asked about relevance, Kraatz' counsel
responded: "This will have relevance, your Honor, to show Mr.
Kraatz' management style and the relevance of some statistics
we'll put in later on and his efficiency and experience."

(R.

1748-1750.)
After the Agreement was signed (and again without
objection), Bry Wilkinson testified to accountability meetings
every 3 0 days with Kraatz concerning profitability.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

[by Mr. Winder] Did you discuss profitability at
these meetings?
[by B. Wilkinson] Oh, yes.
Did you always discuss it?
Well, that was pretty important to him and to me.
I'd say we discussed it most every time, along
with other things.
. . .

Q.
A.

What did you say and what did he say about
profitability?
Well, I mentioned that I had hoped our gross per
car would have been better and our total gross
had been better and that we'd have done a little
better, and he said, "Well, you know, it takes a
little while to get started. Put some people in

4

place and it's going to come, Bry, it's going to
come." (R. 2027-2030.) 5
Instead of objecting to the introduction of extrinsic
evidence, Kraatz took the issue head-on.

Kraatz' expert

testified about whether profitability had in fact declined under
his tenure.

(See generally, R. 2425-30.)

Kraatz took the

approach the dealership was not as profitable as it should have
been because he did not have enough control, or that
profitability was improving.

(See, e.g.. Kraatz' counsel

closing arguments, R. 2446, 2447 & 2449-50.)
Kraatz claimed under the Agreement he had a five-year
no-cut contract.6
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

[by Mr. Zundel] What did he [B. Wilkinson]
say to the employees about you?
[by Mr. Kraatz] Basically . . . just
introduced me as the new general manager,
told the employees that I had a five-year
no-cut contract, that I was going to be the
general manager of the dealership and they
would be responsible to me for their
performance.
Did he ever use the term no-cut contract
with anyone else in your presence in
describing your relationship with Heritage?
I believe he did. He had taken me up to the
executive offices of Key Bank and introduced
me to Mr. David Bronson and Richard Nelson
and George Redd who I'd met on a previous
occasion, I think.
. . .

Q.
A.

Did he use the term no-cut in that
conversation?
That is my recollection, yes.(R. 1832-1833.)

Lack of profitability was the first reason given by Bry
Wilkinson for terminating Kraatz. (FP E.21.a; R. 2033.)
Bry Wilkinson denied such statements (R. 2006 & 2039), as did
Pat Nichols, an employee of the dealership. (R. 2408.)

5

Kraatz also failed to object to the introduction
by Heritage of an initial contract draft, showing the
parties 1 intent concerning causes for termination, in
opposition to Kraatz 1 "no-cut" assertion.7 (R. 1848-49.)
At trial, Kraatz asserted he was entitled to
retirement benefits and Christmas bonuses outlined in an
employee handbook. (Ex. 135, introduced by Kraatz.)

Although he

claimed entitlement to benefits provided in the handbook, he
denied he was subject to its limitations, such as the right of
the dealership to discharge an employee for various kinds of
inappropriate conduct.8 (See FF F.9.d.)

The handbook also made

profitability "the ultimate measure" of efficiency, and
insubordination "cause for discharge." (Id. F.9.f.)
Finally, Kraatz admitted his duties included the care
and keeping of dealership assets, financial forecasting and
producing income for the dealership (or at least supervising the
individuals who generate sales). 9 (R. 1851; FF D.1.-4.)

The initial draft of the contract prepared by Kraatz(FF. B.9;
R. 1849; Ex. 589, see Addendum "B" to Heritage's Brief) was
closer to a "no-cut" contract since it did not provide for
termination for "C. Refusal by Employee to fulfill his
employment responsibilities described in Article I of this
Agreement."
8

B. Wilkinson's reasons for termination related to such
improper conduct. (FF E.21; Tr. 1694; see also FF E.17.)

9

This Court, on page 3 of the Decision, quoted this testimony
in disagreement with the trial court's Findings Kraatz bore
responsibility for profitability. Heritage respectfully submits
this testimony coupled with all the other extrinsic evidence
regarding profitability demonstrates the trial court's Findings
are not clearly erroneous.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE MAY NOT BE CHALLENGED
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
At trial, Kraatz failed to object to the admission of
extrinsic evidence.

A party must make a specific objection to

the admission of evidence and allow the trial judge the
opportunity to correct the alleged error in order to preserve
the issue for appeal- Utah R. Evid. 103; Utah County v. Brown.
672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983); State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Not only did Kraatz not object below, 10

but nowhere in his briefs did he claim the trial court
erroneously considered extrinsic evidence, and thus, the issue
cannot now be considered on appeal.

See Stevenett v. Wal-Mart

Stores. 365 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
Even though the determination of ambiguity is one of
law, that determination must yield to the well-settled rule that
where a party introduces or fails to object to extrinsic
evidence at trial, he cannot raise the issue to his benefit for
the first time on appeal.

In Co-Vest Corp. v. Corbett. 735

P.2d 1308 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court considered a
similar case where parol evidence was admitted by both parties
without objection at trial, with the losing party then objecting

Not until the third day of trial d i d Kraatz 1 counsel object.
His objection then was to relevancy, not the consideration of
extrinsic evidence. Only this one objection was made and it was
never renewed. (Tr. 2036).

7

for the first time on appeal.

The Utah Supreme Court held

"Because defendants did not object to the extrinsic evidence at
the trial level, they cannot claim on appeal that the document
is clear and unambiguous and is not subject to interpretation
with extrinsic evidence."

Id. at 1309.

Similarly, in Shields v. Harris, 934 P.2d 653, 656-67
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), this Court held an appellant:
cannot argue the court was limited to the four
corners of the document after his failure to
object to the introduction of, and his ability to
offer, parol evidence at trial. The trial court
found the terms of the option agreement definite
enough to be enforceable and allowed in extrinsic
evidence to effectuate the terms of the agreement
in accordance with the parties' intent. Id.
Additionally, in In re: Justheim. 824 P.2d 432 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), this court held the failure to object to parol evidence
constitutes a waiver.

This Court ruled "[a] party [is] not

entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and
appellate review of issue." Id., 435 n.4.
It is also improper under the case law for an
appellate court to raise such an issue for the first time
sponte.

sua

"[I]n the absence of special circumstances, an

appellate court will not rule on grounds not addressed in the
trial court."

State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53 (Utah), cert,

denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (1981).

Moreover, "[i]n general, if a

defendant has not raised an issue on appeal, we may not consider
the issue sua sponte."

State v. Rodriguez, 841 P.2d 1228, 1229

(Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Even though ambiguity is a question of law, it may not
override the well-settled principle that an appellate court only

8

addresses issues raised to the trial court.

State v. South, 885

P.2d 795, 798 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(consistent with notions of
fairness, parties are generally entitled to notice of the issues
being appealed before briefing.)
In Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah
1990), the Utah Supreme Court refused to allow an appellant to
object to the extrinsic evidence for the first time on appeal,
holding:
At first blush, it may appear that the trial
court erred in considering the foregoing
extrinsic evidence to ascertain the intent of the
parties without first concluding, as a matter of
law, that the agreement was ambiguous. However,
notwithstanding the lack of a specific finding of
ambiguity, it is implicit in the record before us
that the trial court viewed the settlement
agreement as ambiguous. In addition, it is
apparent that the parties themselves accepted as
a foregone conclusion the ambiguity of the
settlement agreement. This is to be seen in that
although Fitzgeralds objected to the sufficiency
of the evidence recited in the findings of fact,
they did not object in any manner to the failure
of the trial court to conclude that the
settlement agreement was ambiguous. Id. at
360-61.
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court held in State v.
Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997), that "'[I]f a party
through counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain from
objecting or has led the trial court into error, we will then
decline to save that party from the error1 . . . ."

This

holding includes claims under the plain error doctrine.
11

Finally, the plain error doctrine is not applicable where
the trial court was led into the alleged error through Kraatz
introduction of extrinsic evidence. "One who has thus taken his
chances of advantage has not, when he finds the testimony
prejudicial, the legal right to exclude it." In re Justheim,
supra, 824 P.2d at 435 n.4.

9

Kraatz should not be allowed to lead the trial court
into error and then claim the same error for his benefit on
appeal. The trial court's Findings of Fact are supported by the
record, including extrinsic evidence offered by both parties,
and the Conclusions of Law are founded upon credible evidence
and correct law.
POINT II
THE AGREEMENT IS AMBIGUOUS
The Agreement is ambiguous as to the duties and
responsibilities of the General Manager. As stated on page 1 of
the Decision, "A contract provision is ambiguous if it is
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of
'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial
deficiencies.'"

(Citations omitted.)

Accordingly, parol

evidence is admissible in order to ascertain the parties' intent
concerning unexpressed issues.

See Stanqer v. Sentinal Sec.

Life Ins. Co.. 669 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983); Wade v. Stanal.
869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

In this case, there are

many contested issues where the Agreement is silent, especially
•

•

•

•

12

in defining the General Manager's duties.
Article I, f 1.2(a) of the Agreement employs Kraatz as
the General Manager and defines his duties through a partial
listing of examples:
Provide day-to-day management over the
operations of the Dealership, including
managing the new and used car sales
12

The trial court found Kraatz' assertion of a no-cut contract
was not supported by the evidence nor with a comparison of the
draft agreement (Ex. 589) "[which] expands the reasons for
termination under the Agreement." (CL B.10.)

10

departments, service department, parts
department and financing and insurance
departments. (Emphasis supplied). 1
"Include" means "to take in as a part, an element, or a member."
American Heritage Dictionary, p. 913 (3d ed. 1992); see also. In
re Hartman, 443 N.E.2d 516, 5176 (Ohio 1993), citing Webster's
Third New Int'l Dictionary:
In short, 'including1 implies that that which
follows is a partial, not exhaustive, listing
of all which is subsumed within the stated
category. 'Including' is a word of expansion
rather than one of limitation or
restriction"). 14
Based upon its interpretation as a matter of law, this
Court concluded "The duties of a general manager, as specified
in the contract, do not include making a profit."
p. 3.)

(Decision,

Respectfully, how can that conclusion be reconciled with

the remainder of paragraph 1.2(a), providing:
Employee [Kraatz] shall have responsibility
and authority over all aspects of the daily
operations
. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
Isn't profit a "daily aspect" of any business.

Doesn't the

partial listing of services demonstrate clearly these are
"missing terms" which need to be clarified through extrinsic
evidence.

13

See also Paragraph 1.2(b) of the Agreement: "The duties and
responsibilities of Employee [Kraatz] shall include, but not be
limited to . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
14

The Decision (p. 2) held "The ordinary meaning of contract
terms is often best determined through standard, non-legal
dictionaries."

11

The trial court specifically found "Plaintiff's
responsibilities under the Agreement included the production of
income at the Dealership."
& E.l.)

(FF D.l; see also FF D.13; CL B.6

This Finding was based, not just on extrinsic

evidence, 15 but also the language of the Agreement itself,
(CL.D.2.)

The third Recital to the Agreement states:
WHEREAS, Employee [Kraatz] has skills,
personality traits and management skills,
which are conducive to development and
maintenance of such interpersonal relations,
management of personnel, financing and sales
and operating an automobile dealership,
(Emphasis added.) 1 6
The trial court's Findings give prospective effect to

the words "development and maintenance".

If the parties agreed

Kraatz had management skills "conducive to development and
maintenance of" "financing and sales and operating an automobile
dealership," such skills included making a profit. 17

15

"The general manager is the glue t h a t holds the Dealership
together. Plaintiff breached the Employment Agreement by
failing to supply the consideration intended by the parties in
formulating the Agreement." (CL D.l)
16

From this language, this Court determined "the parties
recognized that Kraatz already possessed all the necessary
skills and traits to be a general manager," concluding there was
no "need to hear extrinsic evidence." (Decision, p. 2.) The
trial court, however, found these were the representations of
Kraatz—not the agreement of the parties.
(FF C.2.)
17

Words such as "development" and "maintenance" infer future
action, not just a present representation. Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary (1961) defines "develop" at p. 226, as
follows: "to evolve the possibilities of"; "to advance;
further; to promote the growth of". "Maintain" is defined, at
p. 507, as "to continue or preserve in or with; to carry on...to
uphold and defend...support."

12

Finally, a trial court's decision should be affirmed
on any proper basis, even if not expressly set forth below.
See, e.g., State v. Bryan. 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985).

The

testimony of B. Wilkinson after the execution of the Agreement
concerning accountability meetings demonstrates the parties'
subsequent intent that Kraatz was responsible for profitability.
Either this was a subsequent oral modification to the
18

Agreement

•

•

•

or the best evidence of their intent under that

Agreement under the doctrine of practical construction.

See,

e.g., Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah 1975).
POINT III
EVEN IF UNAMBIGUOUS, KRAATZ BREACHED THE AGREEMENT
BY REFUSING "TO DEVOTE HIS FULL AND
EXCLUSIVE TIME TO PERFORM
HIS SERVICES" AND BY NOT FULFILLING
HIS "RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE
MANAGEMENT TRAINING"
Admittedly, the Agreement gives Kraatz "authority over
all aspects of the daily operations."

(Agreement, f 1.2(b).)

Based upon this provision, this Court concluded:
Nothing in the contract suggests that anyone
other than Kraatz would have authority to set
work schedules. Thus, Kraatz's refusal to work
Saturdays is not cause for his termination.
(Decision, p. 3 . ) 1 9 But the Agreement also expressly provides
in paragraph 1.2(c), in relevant part:

It is fundamental that an Agreement may subsequently be
modified, even where there is an express provision to the
contrary (See f 5.2 of the Agreement). Ted R. Brown & Assoc.,
Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 968 (Utah App. 1988); Rapp
v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 606 P.2d 1189, 1191 (Utah
1980).

13

(c) [Kraatz] shall contribute his best
professional skill to perform the Services at all
times for the business and benefit of the Company
[Heritage]. Employee [Kraatz] agrees to devote
his full and exclusive time to perform the
Services . . . .(emphasis supplied.)
In interpreting a contract, a more specific provision
(relating to the time to be devoted to employment responsibilities such as 5 1.2(c)), governs over a more general one (like
f 1.2(b)).

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §

203(c)(1979).

Kraatz was an employee of Heritage Honda, the

majority shareholder was B. Wilkinson.

(FF A.l.)

B. Wilkinson,

as the owner and dealer, instructed his son J. Wilkinson to
prepare a work schedule to require Kraatz to work more evenings
and Saturdays.

(FF. E.21.d.)

J. Wilkinson testified as

follows:
Q. [by Mr. Zundel] Okay. Now, you prepared a
schedule for Mr. Kraatz to work which has been
marked previously in this case as Exhibit No. 1.
A. [by J. Wilkinson]. Yes.
Q. And you prepared this document at your
father's request; is that right?
A. Correct. (Tr. 2 3 62; see also Tr. 2368.)
Based upon this testimony, the trial court found:
Plaintiff refused to work the schedule B.
Wilkinson had ordered J. Wilkinson to prepare,
despite the fact that the busiest day of the week
in car sales is Saturday, and the busiest sales
time of a day is from 4:00 p.m. until closing.
(Emphasis added.) (FF. D.12.)

1

Nothing in the Agreement, however, expressly says Kraatz has
authority to set his own work schedule or that he didn't answer
to a higher authority i.e., the Dealer. At a minimum, isn't
this then a "missing term" for which consideration may be given
to extrinsic evidence?
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The Agreement in paragraph 2.I.e. states Kraatz may be
terminated for "refusal . . .
responsibilities."

to fulfill his employment

This Court, on page 3 of the Decision,

defines "refuse" as "to show or express a positive unwillingness
to do or comply with."

The question thus arises, to whom could

Kraatz direct any refusal to if not B. Wilkinson?

Could the

Agreement reasonably contemplate Kraatz was to express his
unwillingness to fulfill his management responsibilities to
himself.
law.

Such an interpretation is absurd and disfavored in the

See LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857,

859 (Utah 1988;

Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr. Ltd. v. Smith's

Food, 889 P.2d 445, 458 n.16 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied,
899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 2 0
The Agreement in paragraph 1.2(b) also required Kraatz
to "provide management training to persons selected by Company
to enable said persons to become qualified dealers or managers
acceptable to American Honda, Incorporated.11
on page 4 of its Decision

This Court stated

fl

[a]lthough the record shows that J.

Wilkinson may have been difficult to train, it does not reflect
that Kraatz failed to train him during the contract term.11
Heritage respectfully points out the following Findings of Fact
made by Judge Frederick:

Kraatz claimed the dealer (B. Wilkinson) had overall
responsibility to hire and fire employees. (Tr. 1851) How then
can it be doubted B. Wilkinson has the authority to set the work
schedules for any employees. Further, interpretation that
Kraatz is subject to direction by the business owner is
consistent with a provision in the same Article that Kraatz be
"consulted on all items of long range planning relating to the
dealership.11
(Agreement f 1.2(a).)
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5. The only attempt during his entire twentyseven month tenure that Plaintiff made to train
either J. Wilkinson or Jeff Gorringe was to place
J. Wilkinson in financing and insurance ("F &
I"). At no time did Plaintiff ever attempt to
place J. Wilkinson in the Parts Department,
Service Department, or in Accounting. At no time
did Plaintiff give instruction to J. Wilkinson on
the hiring and firing of personnel, on management
of assets, on employee interviews, or other
aspects of general management.
6.

J. Wilkinson testified he received no
training while in F&I.

. . .

16. The testimony of B. Wilkinson and J.
Wilkinson is uncontroverted that Plaintiff failed
to train J. Wilkinson to become a qualified
dealer or manager acceptable to American Honda.
(FF E.5, 6, & 16)
Respectfully, this Court cannot disregard or overturn
factual findings based on credible evidence.

This Court may

only overturn factual findings if they are clearly erroneous and
not supported in the record after resolving all disputes in a
light favorable to the trial court's determination.

See State

v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North, 942 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah
1997).

Moreover, in Hansen v. Green River Group. 748 P.2d 1102,

1104 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), this Court ruled:
if the contract is ambiguous and the trial court
makes factual findings about the intent of the
parties based on extrinsic evidence, our review is
strictly limited. If those findings are supported
by substantial, competent evidence in the record,
they are not clearly erroneous under Utah R. Civ.
P* 52(a) and we will not disturb them on appeal.
The trial court's Findings of Fact outlined above are
supported in the Record (Tr. 2380-81.)
B. Wilkinson had semi-retired, leaving the day-to-day
management of Heritage to Kraatz. (FF. B.5)
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The purpose of this

training was B. Wilkinson's plan to pass the business on to his
family members.

(Tr. 2041, 2467.)

Although Kraatz made a conclusory claim he attempted
to train the children, (see Tr. 1794.), he provided no
supporting details.

When faced with contradictory testimony,

the trial court, as fact finder, may weigh conflicting
testimony, assess credibility and demeanor, and believe one
witness over another.
Ct. App. 1996).

See State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah

In this case, the trial court believed the

testimony from J. Wilkinson over Kraatz' unsupported claim.
(See R. 2466.)
This Court's Decision (p. 4) also states the "Record
contains no evidence suggesting that J. Wilkinson or Jeff
Gorringe were unacceptable to American Honda, Incorporated."
Since these individuals received no training, how could they
have been submitted to American Honda.
a useless act.

The law does not require

See Jenkins v. Equipment Ctr., Inc., 869 P.2d

1000, 1003 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied sub nom. 879 P.2d 266
(1994) .
This Court finally found "even if Kraatz had, up to
that point, failed to train the named individuals according to
Honda's standards, he still had thirty-three months left on his
contract to complete the training."21 The Agreement provides
cause for termination for Kraatz' refusal "to fulfill" his
management responsibilities.

"Fulfill" means "to carry into

effect, as an intention, to bring to pass, as a design...to
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realize or manifest completely."
Dictionary, supra. p. 335.

Webster's Collegiate

Kraatz should not be able to refuse

to fulfill his responsibilities for the first twenty-seven
months (4 5% of contract term) and claim immunity from
termination.
Could Kraatz have been excused from 27 months of
nonperformance under a construction contract or a promissory
note? It is well settled where time of performance is not
explicitly stated in a contract, performance will be required
within a "reasonable time."

See Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v.

Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 858 (Utah 1998).

Failing to perform for

twenty-seven months of a sixty-month contract is not a
"reasonable time." 22
POINT IV
OTHER REASONS JUSTIFYING DISCHARGE
The Agreement in 5 1.2(c) required Kraatz to use his
best professional skill to perform services at all times for the
business and benefit of Heritage.

Besides the reasons set forth

above, Kraatz failed to perform his responsibilities by making
poor decisions on financing that cost the dealership $114,000
(see FF E.13; Tr. 2040, 2034.), failed to control inventory,
21

The trial court made no such Finding of Fact. Respectfully,
it is pure speculation that Kraatz would have made the attempt.

22

Kraatz introduced no evidence of acceptability to American
Honda or that he could adequately train designated persons to
take over all areas of the dealership (i.e., finance &
insurance, parts, service, accounting, sales, and personnel) in
thirty-three months. His failure to do so is fatal since he had
the burden to prove performance under the Agreement. See
Russell v. Qgden Union R.R. & Depot Co., 247 P.2d 257 (Utah
1952) .
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failed to provide customer service and failed to maintain
company morale. (See FF E. 21; Tr. 2033-34, 2041, 2411.)
CONCLUSION
Heritage respectfully requests this Court reconsider its
Decision issued March 11, 1999, because Kraatz never objected to
extrinsic evidence, introduced much of it himself, and because
the case was tried as if the Agreement was ambiguous.

The

extrinsic evidence supported the trial court's Findings which
are entitled to deference from this Court.

Heritage submits,

for all the reasons set forth herein, the trial court's decision
concerning termination should be affirmed and the issues raised
on cross-appeal considered.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/

day of April,

1999.

Donald J. Winder, Esq,
Gerry B. Holman, Esq.
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants/
Appellees and CrossAppellants

19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct
copies of the Petition for Rehearing and Addendum to be mailed,
postage prepaid, this

y^

day of April, 1999, to:

Kent B. Linebaugh, Esq.
Michael N. Zundel, Esq,
Jennie B. Garner, Esq.
JARDINE LINEBAUGH & DUNN
370 East South Temple #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

A

20

